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Abstract
During the last ten years or so, derivations of the Born rule based on decision
theory have been proposed and developed, and it is claimed that these are
valid in the context of the Everett interpretation. This claim is critically as-
sessed and it is shown that one of its key assumptions is a natural consequence
of the principles underlying the Copenhagen interpretation, but constitutes
a major additional postulate in an Everettian context. It is further argued
that the Born rule, in common with any interpretation that relates outcome
likelihood to the expansion coefficients connecting the wavefunction with the
eigenfunctions of the measurement operator, is incompatible with the purely
unitary evolution assumed in the Everett interpretation.
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Introduction
The conventional (“Copenhagen”) interpretation of quantum mechanics
states that the result of a measurement is one (and only one) of the eigen-
values belonging to the operator representing the measurement and that,
following the measurement, the wavefunction “collapses” to become the cor-
responding eigenfunction (ignoring the possibility of degeneracy). According
to the “Born rule”, the probability of any particular outcome is proportional
to the squared modulus of the scalar product of this eigenfunction with the
pre-measurement wavefunction. This analysis underlies many of the pre-
dictions of quantum mechanics that have been invariably confirmed by ex-
periment. An alternative approach to quantum measurement is the Everett
interpretation (also known as the “relative states” or the “many worlds” in-
terpretation) which was proposed by Everett III (1957). The essence of this
approach is that it assumes no collapse of the wavefunction associated with a
measurement: instead, the time development of the state is everywhere gov-
erned by the time-dependent Schro¨dinger equation. After a “measurement-
like” event, this results in a splitting of the wavefunction into a number of
branches, which are then incapable of reuniting or communicating with each
other in any way. This splitting occurs even when a human observer is part
of the measurement chain: the resulting branches then each contain a copy
of the observer, who is completely unaware of the existence of the others.
Since its inception, the Everett interpretation has been subject to con-
siderable criticism—e.g. Kent (1990), Squires (1990)—which has three main
strands (or branches [sic]). First, there is its metaphysical extravagance. The
continual evolution of the universe into a “multiverse” containing an immense
number of branches would mean that the universe we observe should be ac-
companied by an immense number of parallel universes, which we do not
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observe and have no awareness of—surely such a postulate must be a gross
breach of the principle of Occam’s razor! Everett himself was aware of this
criticism and, in a footnote to his original paper, he compares the conceptual
difficulties of accepting his interpretation with those encountered by Coper-
nicus when the latter proposed the (in his time revolutionary) idea that the
earth moves around the sun. However, the reason that the Occam’s razor
argument has not led to the universal rejection of Everett’s ideas is less to do
with the strength or otherwise of the Copernican analogy and more a result
of the fact that the branching of the universe into the multiverse is claimed
to be a direct consequence of the time-dependent Schro¨dinger equation: no
additional postulate, such as the collapse of the wavefunction, is required to
explain the phenomenon of quantum measurement and the extravagance with
universes may therefore be considered a price worth paying for the economy
in postulates.
The second strand in the criticism of Everett is known as the “preferred
basis” problem. This is because there is an apparent ambiguity in the way
the branches are defined. Thus, if the wavefunction of a system has the
form ψ = Aψ1 +Bψ2, then Everett suggests that a measurement should lead
to two sets of branches, one associated with each of the states represented
by ψ1 and ψ2. However, the original state could just as well be written as
ψ = Cφ1 + Dφ2 where φ1 = 2
−1/2(ψ1 + ψ2), φ2 = 2−1/2(ψ1 − ψ2), C =
2−1/2(A + B) and D = 2−1/2(A − B), so why should the branches not be
just as well defined by φ1 and φ2—or indeed any other orthogonal pair of
linear combinations of ψ1 and ψ2? This problem has been largely resolved
by the appreciation of the importance of the effect of the environment on a
quantum system and the associated “decoherence”—Zurek (2008), Wallace
(2002), Wallace (2003a). A quantum measurement is inevitably accompanied
by complex, chaotic processes which act to pick out the particular basis
defined by the eigenstates of the measurement operator. This basis is then
the one “preferred” by the Everett interpretation and this supervenes on the
Schro¨dinger wavefunction. This result is now generally accepted, although
Baker (2006) argues that its derivation uses the Born rule so that there is a
danger of circularity if it is then assumed as part of its proof.
The third criticism leveled at Everett is the problem of probabilities. The
conventional (Copenhagen) interpretation states that, if the wavefunction be-
fore a measurement is ψ = Aψ1 + Bψ2, and if ψ1 and ψ2 are eigenstates of
the measurement operator with eigenvalues q1 and q2 respectively, then the
outcome will be either q1 with probability |A2| or q2 with probability |B2|,
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where these probabilities reflect the frequencies of the corresponding out-
comes after a large number of similar measurements. However, according to
the Everett approach there is no “either-or” because both outcomes are man-
ifest, albeit in different branches. Instead of a disjunction to which we can
apply standard probability theory, we have a conjunction, where it is hard to
see how probabilities can make any sense—Squires (1990), Graham (1973),
Lewis (2004). There have been several attempts to resolve this conundrum
and to show how probability (or something else that is in practice equivalent
to it) can be used in an Everettian context. David Wallace has proposed
a principle that he calls “subjective uncertainty” in which he claims that a
rational observer should expect to emerge in one branch after a measure-
ment, even although she is also reproduced in the other branches—Wallace
(2003b), Wallace (2007) . Greaves (2004) has criticized this approach and
suggested an alternative in which we have to take into account the observer’s
“descendants” in all the branches, but we should “care” more about some
than others; the extent to which we should care is quantified by a “caring
measure” that is proportional to the corresponding Born-rule weight. Both
these approaches are designed to explain why some branches appear to be
favoured over others, but both attempt to do this without altering Everett’s
main principle that the quantum state evolves under the influence of the
time-dependent Schro¨dinger equation with nothing else added, so that the
Born rule supervenes on this. An alternative approach, which I shall not
discuss any further in this paper, is to maintain most of the fundamental
ideas of the Everettian interpretation, but add a further layer of “reality” to
justify the use of probabilities; an example of this can be found in Lockwood
(1989).
Interest in the Everett interpretation has been on the increase recently—
particularly during 2007, which was the 50th anniversary of the publication of
Everett’s original paper, Everett III (1957). Much of the renewed interest has
developed from work by Deutsch (1999) some eight years earlier, which was
then developed by, Wallace (2003b), Saunders (2004) and Wallace (2007).
This programme (which I refer to below by the initials DSW) aims to derive
the Born rule from minimal postulates that are claimed to be consistent with
the Everett interpretation, as well as with other approaches to the measure-
ment problem. In fact, Deutsch (1999) makes little reference to the Everett
interpretation in his derivation of the Born rule and Saunders (2004) empha-
sizes that he believes that his derivation is independent of any assumptions
about the measurement process. However, Wallace (2007) assumes the Ev-
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erett interpretation and claims that his derivation shows that the Born rule
is completely consistent with it. Gill (2005) examined Deutsch’s derivation
and sought to clarify the assumptions underlying it, again without referring
to the Everett interpretation as such. A similar approach, but using slightly
different assumptions has been developed Zurek and is set out in a recent
review paper, Zurek (2008).
The present paper aims to show that some of the postulates underlying
the above derivations arguments do not follow naturally from the Everett
interpretation and may well not be consistent with it.
The DSW Proof of the Born Rule
This section sets out the DSW derivation of the Born rule by applying
it to a particular example. The argument is deliberately kept as simple as
possible and more general treatments can be found in the cited references.
Consider the case of a spin-half particle, initially in an eigenstate of an op-
erator representing a component of spin in a direction in the xz plane at
an angle θ to the z axis, passing along the y axis through a Stern-Gerlach
apparatus oriented to measure a spin component in the z direction.
Standard quantum mechanics tells us that the initial state αθ can be
written as a linear combination of the eigenstates of Sˆz: α with eigenvalue
+1 (in units of ~/2) and β with eigenvalue -1. We have
αθ = cα + sβ (1)
where c = cos(θ/2) and s = sin(θ/2). Particles emerge from the two channels
of the Stern-Gerlach apparatus, with the upper and lower channels indicating
Sz = +1 and −1 respectively and are then detected. After they have entered
the detectors, but before any collapse1 associated with the measurement, the
total wavefunction of the system is
ψ = cαχ+ + sβχ− (2)
1At a number of points in this paper, I compare the predictions of the Everett model
with those produced by the “Copenhagen interpretation”, by which I mean a model in
which the wavefunction collapses into one of the eigenstates of the measurement operator.
This is assumed to occur early enough in the process for the outcomes to be the same as
would be observed if particles were emerge randomly from one or other output channel,
with the relative probabilities of the two outcomes determined by the Born rule.
5
where χ+ (χ−) is the wavefunction representing the detectors, including their
environment, when a particle is detected in the positive (negative) channel.
According to the Copenhagen interpretation, the corresponding probabilities
for a positive or negative outcome are given by the Born rule as c2 and s2
respectively. From the Everettian point of view, on the other hand, there
is no collapse and the system is always in a state of the form ψ. However,
because of the effects of the environment and decoherence, phase coherence
between the two terms on the right-hand side of (2) is lost, so they can
never in practice interfere. The wavefunction has therefore evolved into two
“branches” which then develop independently.
The principle of the DSW approach is to describe the process being stud-
ied as a game, or series of games, where we receive rewards, or pay penalties
(i.e. receive negative rewards) depending on the outcomes. The derivation
proposed by Zurek (2008) is quite similar to this, although it does not use
game theory.
Imagine a game where the player receives a reward depending on the
outcome of the experiment. Assume that the value of θ is under our control
and that, whenever the experimenter observes a particle emerging from the
positive or negative channel of the Stern-Gerlach apparatus, she receives a
reward equal to x+ or x− respectively; these values can be chosen arbitrarily
by the experimenter. In the special cases where θ = 0 or θ = pi, the initial
spin state is an eigenstate of Sˆz with eigenvalues +1 and −1 respectively.
The particle then definitely emerges from the corresponding channel of the
Stern-Gerlach apparatus and the corresponding reward is paid.
In the general case, we define the “value”—V (θ)—of the game as the
minimum payment a rational player would accept not to play the game, and
look for an expression for V (θ) of the form
V (θ) = w+(θ)x+ + w−(θ)x− (3)
where the ws are non-negative real numbers that we call “weights” and which
are normalized so that their total is unity. We shall find that
w+(θ) = c
2 and w−(θ) = s2 (4)
which are the probabilities predicted by the Born rule for this setup.
First consider the effect on the wavefunction of rotating the SG magnet
through 180◦ about the y axis. It follows from the symmetry of the Stern-
Gerlach apparatus that spins that were previously directed into the upper
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channel will now be detected in the lower channel and vice versa. Thus
V (θ + pi) = w+(θ + pi)x+ + w−(θ + pi)x− = w−(θ)x+ + w+(θ)x− (5)
From standard quantum mechanics, the effect of this rotation on the wave-
function (2) is to transform it to
ψ = −sαχ+ + cβχ− (6)
We now proceed by considering a series of particular values of θ.
Case 1 The first case is where θ = 0 so that the initial state, αθ, is
identical with α. As noted above, this state is unaffected by the measurement
and the particle is always detected in the positive channel. Thus V (0) = x+,
w+(0) = 1 and w−(0) = 0. Similarly, V (pi) = x−, w+(pi) = 0 and w−(pi) = 1.
Case 2 In the second case, θ = pi/2 so that ψ is as in (2) above, but with
c = s = 2−1/2. Now consider the effect of rotating the Stern Gerlach appara-
tus through an angle pi. Using (5) and (6), we get the following expressions
for V and ψ
V (3pi/2) = w−(pi/2)x+ + w+(pi/2)x− (7)
ψ = 2−1/2[−αχ+ + βχ−] (8)
The only change in the wavefunction is the change of sign in the term in-
volving α. DSW point out that this sign, in common with any other phase
factor, should not affect the value, because it can be removed by performing
a unitary transformation on this part of the wavefunction only—e.g. by a
rotation of the spin through 2pi or by introducing an additional path length
equal to half a wavelength. Moreover, Zurek (2008) shows that one of the
effects of the interaction of the system with the environment is to remove
any physical significance from these phase factors. It follows that the value
should not be affected by the rotation so that V (3pi/2) = V (pi/2), which
leads directly to
w+(pi/2) = w−(pi/2) = 1/2 and V (pi/2) = (x+ + x−)/2 (9)
This result (which might be thought to be an inevitable consequence of
symmetry) is considered by DSW to be the key point of the proof. We should
note that, although it agrees with the Born rule, it would also be consistent
with any alternative weighting scheme that predicted equal weights in this
symmetric situation: in particular it is consistent with a model in which the
weights were assumed to be independent of θ.
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We now extend the result to the case where the number of output channels
is M instead of two and the wavefunction is the sum of M terms, each of
which corresponds to a different eigenstate of the measurement operator. In
the case where the coefficients of this expansion are all equal, any action that
has the effect of exchanging any two output channels (which are numbered 1
and 2) must leave the wavefunction unchanged apart from irrelevant changes
in phase. The value is then also unchanged, but the roles of w1 and w2 are
reversed. Hence
w1x1 + w2x2 = w1x2 + w2x1 (10)
where xi is the reward associated with the ith output channel. It follows
that w1 = w2; consideration of other permutations immediately extends this
result to all i and we have wi = N
−1.
Case 3 In the third case, θ = pi/3 so that cos(θ/2) =
√
3/2 and sin(θ/2) =
1/2. We now assume that the system is modified so that, after emerging from
the Stern-Gerlach magnet and before being detected, the outgoing particles
interact with a separate quantum system that can exist in one of, or a linear
combination of four eigenstates φi. Following Zurek (2008), this is referred
to as an “ancilla” from now on. The ancilla is designed so that, if θ = 0
so that all spins emerge from the positive channel, the ancilla is placed in
the state 3−1/2
∑
i=1,3 φi; while, if θ = pi and all spins are negative, its state
becomes φ4. From linear superposition it follows that if the original spin is
in a state of the form (2) with θ = pi/3, the total wavefunction of the spin
plus the ancilla is
Ψ = 3−1/2[φ1 + φ2 + φ3] cos(pi/6)α + φ4 sin(pi/6)β
= 1
2
[φ1α + φ2α + φ3α + φ4β] (11)
As the coefficients of each term in the above expansion are equal, it follows
from the earlier discussion of Case 2 that all four weights are equal to 0.25.
If we were to measure on the ancilla a quantity whose eigenstates were one
of the functions φ1 to φ4, we should obtain a result equal to one of the
corresponding eigenvalues. If the result corresponds to one of the first three
eigenfunctions, we can conclude that if, instead, we had measured the spin
directly, we would have got a positive result, while a result corresponding to
φ4 indicates a negative spin. As this is the only such state, it follows that
the weight corresponding to a negative spin is w−(pi/3) = 0.25 and therefore,
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from normalization, that w+(pi/3) = 0.75. (The last step, which follows
Zurek (2008), establishes these results without assuming that the weights are
additive.) The value of the game therefore equals 0.75x+ + 0.25x−. It can
also be shown quite straight forwardly—Zurek (2008)—that, after a number
of repeats of the experiment, the predicted distribution of the results is as
observed experimentally.
Following DSW, the above argument can be extended to the case of a mea-
surement made in the absence of the ancilla if we make a further assumption,
known as “measurement neutrality”. This states that the outcome of the
game is independent of the details of the measurement process—i.e. the pres-
ence or absence of the ancilla—so that w+(pi/3) = 0.75 and w−(pi/3) = 0.25
in either case. These quantities are identical to cos2(θ/2) and sin2(θ/2) re-
spectively, so the derived weights are the same as those predicted by the
Born rule. By choosing an appropriate ancilla, the above argument can be
directly extended to examples where the ratio of the weights is any rational
number, and then to the general case by assuming that the weights are con-
tinuous functions of θ. Hence, the expression for the value is the same as
that predicted by the Born-rule:
V (θ) = c2x+ + s
2x− (12)
Further generalization to experiments with more then two possible outcomes
is reasonably straightforward and does not introduce any major new princi-
ples.
Discussion
There have been a number of criticisms of the DSW proof when applied
to the Everett model in particular—e.g. Baker (2006), Barnum et al. (2000),
Lewis (2005), Lewis (2007), Hemmo and Pitowski (2007); some of these even
challenge the result (9) for the symmetric case. I shall shortly develop argu-
ments to show that, although the symmetric results appear to be consistent
with the Everett model, this may not be not so in the asymmetric case.
First consider how the above translates into predictions of experimental
results. The game value is the minimum payment a rational observer would
accept in order not to play the game. This means that after playing the
game a number of times, a rational observer should expect to receive a set
of rewards whose average is equal to the game value. Thus, if we consider
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a sequence of N such observations in which n+ and n−(= N − n+) particles
are detected in the positive and negative channels respectively, the total
reward received will be n+x++n−x−, and this should equal N(w+x++w−x−)
implying that w+ = n+/N and w− = n−/N . This, of course, is just what is
observed in a typical experiment provided N is large enough for statistical
fluctuations to be negligible. It should be noted that frequencies are not being
used to define probabilities, but the derived weights are used to predict the
results of experimental measurement of the frequencies.
The above results are of course consistent with the standard Copen-
hagen interpretation, whose fundamental mantra was set out by Bohr (1935):
“...there is essentially the question of an influence on the very conditions
which define the possible types of predictions regarding the future behaviour
of the system”. In the present context, this means that, because an experi-
ment designed to demonstrate interference would involve a different experi-
mental arrangement, the experiment can be modelled as a classical stochastic
system in which spins emerge from either the positive or the negative chan-
nel of the Stern-Gerlach apparatus. (It should be noted that this paper does
not aim to justify the Copenhagen interpretation, but employs its results as
a comparator with the Everettian case.)
Why should an Everettian observer have experiences such as those just
described? In the Everett interpretation, the quantum state evolves deter-
ministically and on first sight, there would appear to be no room for uncer-
tainty. However, after a splitting has occurred, observers in different branches
have the same memories of their state before the split, but undergo different
experiences after it. Given this, it may be meaningful for an experimenter to
have an opinion about the likelihood of becoming a particular one of her suc-
cessors. This introduces a form of subjective uncertainty, and Wallace (2007)
claims that this plays a role in the Everett interpretation that is equivalent
to that played by objective stochastic uncertainty in the Copenhagen case.
However, we should note that such subjective uncertainty can only come into
play at the point where the experimenter becomes aware of an experimental
result, in contrast to the Copenhagen model where the splitting is assumed
to occur as the particles emerge from the Stern-Gerlach magnet. I shall
shortly proceed to compare and contrast the Copenhagen and Everettian
interpretations of the different experiments discussed above. To help focus
the discussion, I shall initially assume that in such experiments each par-
ticular result is associated with only one branch of the final wavefunction.
This assumption has been strongly criticized by DSW and others and I shall
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return to the question of how it affects our conclusions at a later stage. I
now analyze our earlier arguments step by step.
Case 1: Copenhagen As the initial spin state is in an eigenstate of Sz,
the result is completely determined. The probability of the result equalling
the corresponding eigenvalue is 1 and the probability of the alternative is
zero.
Case 1: Everett There is only one branch and this contains the only
copy of the observer who invariably records the appropriate eigenvalue.
There is therefore no difference between the observers’ experiences in case
1 under the Copenhagen and Everettian interpretations.
Case 2: Copenhagen The probabilities of positive and negative results
are both 0.5. After a large number of repeats of the experiment, the ex-
perimenter will have recorded approximately equal numbers of positive and
negative results, so her average reward will be (x1 +x2)/2, which is the same
as the game value.
Case 2: Everett The observer will split into two copies each time a spin
is observed and the weights of the two branches are equal for the reasons
discussed earlier. After a large number (N) of repeats of the experiment the
vast majority of observers will have recorded close to N/2 positive and N/2
negative results and their average rewards will both equal the game value.
There is therefore no difference between the predictions of the Copen-
hagen and Everettian interpretations in case 2.
Case 3: Copenhagen As emphasized above, this assumes that the ex-
periment is a stochastic process in which a particle emerges from either the
positive and or the negative channel and the relative probabilities of the out-
comes are equal to the Born weights. In the presence of the ancilla, a particle
is detected in one (and only one) of the equally-weighted states φ1 to φ4, and
all four outcomes have equal probability. To have been observed in any of
the first three states, the spin must have emerged from the Stern-Gerlach ex-
periment through the positive channel, while if the final result corresponded
to φ4, it must have come through the negative channel. It follows directly
that if the ancilla were absent, three times as many spins would be detected
as positive than as negative. Thus, the principle of measurement neutral-
ity, assumed in stage 3 of the earlier derivation, follows naturally from the
assumptions underlying the Copenhagen interpretation.
Case 3: Everett We first consider the situation where an ancilla is
present so that the state is described by (11); there are therefore four equally-
weighted branches, one corresponding to each of the φi. The observer splits
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into four equally-weighted copies and should expect her descendants to record
an equal number of each of the four possible results and therefore conclude
that there are three times as many positive as negative spins. However, in
the absence of an ancilla, there are only two branches and the observer is
split into two copies each time a result is obtained. To show that a typical
Everettian observer should record results that are consistent with the Born
weights, we again have to apply the principle of measurement neutrality.
We saw above that this is a natural, if not inevitable, consequence of the
Copenhagen interpretation, but we shall now demonstrate that this is not
the case in an Everettian context.
Under the Copenhagen interpretation, particles are assumed to emerge
from either the positive or the negative channel and then into one, and only
one, of the states φi. This is not true in the case of the Everett interpreta-
tion, where the system evolves deterministically and the state is described
by a linear combination of the wavefunctions associated with a particle being
present in each channel. Apparent stochasticity, or subjective uncertainty,
only enters the situation at the point where the experimenter observes the
result and splits into a number of descendants—two in the absence of the
ancilla and four if it is present. There is no requirement for the frequencies
to be the same in both cases—i.e. no a priori reason to apply the principle
of measurement neutrality. In the language of decision theory, the values
of the two games are not necessarily the same, so a decision on whether or
not to accept a payoff may depend on whether the game is being played
with or without an ancilla. Indeed, as in the absence of an ancilla there
are only two branches, we might expect each observer’s experience to be the
same as in case 2, with equal numbers of positive and negative results and
an equal reward for each outcome—i.e. the statistical outcomes would be
independent of the weights. I shall argue later that this is a natural con-
sequence of the Everettian interpretation, but at present simply emphasize
that the principle of measurement neutrality is a self-evident consequence of
the assumptions underlying the Copenhagen interpretation, but constitutes
a major additional postulate in the context of Everett.
I further illustrate this last point by considering a simple classical example
that consists of a box with two exit ports from each of which a series of balls
emerges as in figure 1. The apparatus can be operated in one of two modes
that we denote as “C” and “E”. In the C mode, balls emerge one at a time
from one of two output ports and, on average, three times as many come out
of the upper port as from the lower. An experimenter observes the balls as
12
CMode E Mode
Figure 1: In the cop mode a ball is emitted from the first box through either the
upper or the lower port and detected either before or after entering the second
box; the figure shows one possible outcome. In the eve mode, balls emerge from
both ports and one of them is detected either before or after the second box, which
releases three balls every time one enters.
they emerge and confirms this relative likelihood. Still in the C mode, the
experiment is modified so that when a ball emerges from the upper port, it
passes into a second, “ancillary” box and then emerges at random through
one of three output channels before being detected. The experimenter now
detects a ball either in one of these three channels or emerging from the lower
port. Clearly the first of these results is three times as likely as the second,
so the observed frequencies are independent of the presence or absence of
the second box. Thus the equivalent of measurement neutrality holds in this
case.
Now consider the game in the E mode, which is also illustrated in figure
1. In this case two balls emerge from the box simultaneously: a black ball,
from the upper port and a white ball from the lower. The two balls fall
into a receptacle (not shown in the figure) and an experimenter draws one
at random; after repeating the experiment a number of times she sees equal
numbers of black and white balls. The experiment is now modified so that
the black balls are directed into an ancillary box which now contains a device
that releases three identical black balls, one through each of the three output
ports, whenever one enters. These three balls along with the white one now
fall into the receptacle and the observer again draws one at random; she now
sees a black ball three times as often as a white ball. Thus, the relative
likelihood of a black or white ball depends on the presence or absence of
the second box, and we can conclude that measurement neutrality is not
necessarily preserved when the game is played in the E mode.
A more whimsical analogy follows the precedent set by Schro¨dinger’s cat
by using animals to illustrate our point. First consider Copenhagen rabbits.
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These come in two colours—black and white; they are all female and capable
of giving birth to one (and only one) baby rabbit which is always of the
same colour as its mother. Let us suppose we have four Copenhagen rabbits,
three black and one white in a hat and suppose that one, of them, chosen
at random, is pregnant. We first play the game of “pick out the pregnant
rabbit” by putting our hand in the hat, identifying and then pulling out the
pregnant rabbit. We are paid different rewards (xb and xw) depending on
whether the extracted rabbit is black or white. After playing the game a
number of times, we find that we have pulled out three times as many black
rabbits as white, so that the game value is (3xb + xw)/4. The second game
is one where we wait until the pregnant rabbit has given birth and then pull
out and identify the colour of the baby. Clearly the results and the value are
the same as in the first game.
Now consider Everettian rabbits, which are also either black or white. In
contrast to the Copenhagen rabbits, they are capable of carrying and giving
birth to more than one offspring. Suppose we have two pregnant Everettian
rabbits: a white rabbit that is pregnant with a single offspring, and a black
rabbit that is expecting triplets. If we draw one of the two pregnant rabbits
from the hat at random, the game value will be (xb + xw)/2. However, if,
instead, we wait until after the rabbits have given birth and then draw out
one of the offspring at random, the game value will now be (3xb + xw)/4.
Thus Copenhagen rabbits preserve measurement neutrality, but Everettian
rabbits do not.
Given the assumptions underlying the Copenhagen interpretation, the
first game in the C mode and the game with the Copenhagen rabbits form
close parallels with the quantum example discussed earlier. Similarly, the
first game in the E mode and the game with Everettian rabbits are closely
parallel to the quantum case, provided we accept that random selection at
the point where the observer becomes aware of the result is equivalent to
subjective uncertainty in the quantum case.
In both these examples as well as in the quantum case, I have shown that
measurement neutrality is not a necessary consequence of the principles un-
derlying the Everett interpretation. However, in all the cases where it need
not apply, the symmetry is broken in the sense that the weights associated
with the different outcomes are not equal. It follows that measurement neu-
trality (or, indeed, some other quite different principle) could be restored
in the classical examples by making additional assumptions: for example,
it could be arranged that the ball emerging from the upper channel in the
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E game is heavier than that coming out of the lower, and that it is three
times easier to find and extract a more massive ball when making the se-
lection; similarly, it might be three times easier to catch a rabbit carrying
triplets than one pregnant with a single offspring. However, such ad hoc rules
would have to be built into the physics of the set up when it was designed and
constructed. In the quantum case under the Everett interpretation, measure-
ment neutrality therefore has to be an additional assumption, rather than
following directly from the structure of the theory as in the Copenhagen case.
Gill (2005) shows that measurement neutrality is equivalent to assuming that
measures of probability are invariant under functional transformations —i.e.
the probability of obtaining a particular result when measuring a variable is
the same as that pertaining when a function of the variable is measured. He
considers that functional invariance in the case of one-to-one transformations
is “more or less definitional”, but is much less obvious in the many-to-one
case, which is required for situations such as case 3 above. Gill’s discus-
sion relates to probabilities as conventionally defined and his paper makes
no reference to the Everett interpretation. I believe that the above argument
shows that many-to-one transformations are also “more or less definitional”
under the Copenhagen interpretation, but not in the Everettian context.
Measurement neutrality and an associated principle that he calls “equiv-
alence” have been argued for by David Wallace in a number of papers—
Wallace (2002), Wallace (2003a),Wallace (2003b), Wallace (2007). He con-
siders games in which the measurement result is erased after it triggers an
associated reward and before the experimenter has recorded the outcome. In
the symmetric (θ = pi/2) case, the final states are independent of the pattern
of rewards, which reinforces the arguments leading to (9). However, this is
not an issue in the present discussion, which challenges the assumption of
measurement neutrality only in the asymmetric case. Another point empha-
sized by Wallace (2007) is that the boundary between what is usually taken
as preparation and what is part of the “actual” measurement is essentially
arbitrary, particularly in the context of the Everett interpretation. However,
the observation and recording of the result by a conscious observer is part of
the measurement proper, and it is only at this point that subjective uncer-
tainty or the relevance of a caring measure is introduced into the Everettian
treatment of the Born rule.
Up to this point I have argued that the assumptions underlying the deriva-
tion of the Born rule, in particular measurement neutrality, are not necessary
in an Everettian context, though they may be treated as added postulates.
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I now intend to go further and argue that there is an inconsistency between
the assumptions underlying the Everett interpretation and the Born rule—
or, indeed any rule that relates the likelihood of a measurement outcome to
the amplitudes (c and s in the above example) associated with the branching
of the wavefunction in a non-trivial way. I shall continue to use the example
of the measurement of the spin component of a spin-half particle as a focus
of the discussion.
The scenario I now discuss is one where an observer (“Bob”) records the
number of positive spins (M) in a set of measurements of the state of N
identically prepared spins that have passed through a Stern-Gerlach appara-
tus. We consider the particular case where Bob does not know the value of
θ before he makes any measurements ; that is, he has not seen the apparatus
or been told how the magnet is oriented, which means that his initial state
is represented by a wavefunction which is independent of θ. However, if Bob
knows the Born rule, he can estimate the value of θ as 2 cos−1(M/N)1/2 and
his confidence in this value will be the greater, the larger are M and N . As a
result of this experience, Bob’s state has been changed from one of ignorance
to one where he has some knowledge of θ. This change must therefore have
been reflected in Bob’s quantum state, causing a modification to his wave-
function, which now depends on θ. To further emphasize this point, suppose
that the value of θ can be changed without Bob’s direct knowledge by another
experimenter (“Alice”) who has control of the Stern-Gerlach apparatus. If
she does this and the experiment is repeated a number of times at the new
setting, Bob will find that his expectations have been consistently wrong.
He may initially attribute this to statistical fluctuation, but eventually he
will amend his state of expectation to bring it into line with his experience.
Indeed, Bob may know that Alice is able to do this, in which case he will
be more likely to amend his state of expectation at an earlier stage. Alice
could then send signals to Bob by transmitting sets of N particles using the
same value of θ for each set, but changing it between sets. If the Born rule
applies, Bob can deduce the values of θ that Alice has used from the relative
numbers of positive and negative results, so Alice has again caused changes
in Bob’s state of expectation and therefore of his wavefunction.
It is one of the principles of the Everett interpretation that, once branch-
ing has occurred and the possibility of interference between branches has been
eliminated, the wavefunction associated with a branch describes the “relative
state” of the system contained in that branch, which cannot be influenced
by the state of any other branch. Moreover, the form of the relative state
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functions, which represent the whole branch including the version of Bob
associated with it, are the same whatever are the values of the expansion
coefficients c and s. This implies that the properties of a system represented
by such a relative state are not affected by the measuring process. Thus,
although these constants enter the expressions, they do so only as expansion
coefficients, which have no effect on the wavefunctions of the relative states
associated with the component branches. In particular, the observer’s state
of knowledge of the value of θ cannot be altered as a result of this process.
This is in direct contradiction to the conclusion reached above, assuming
that the Born rule holds. There is therefore an inconsistency between the
principles underlying the Everett interpretation and the appearance of a cor-
relation between the apparatus setting and the relative frequencies of the
possible outcomes, such as is implied by the Born rule.
To develop this point further, consider the state of the whole system after
N particles have passed through the apparatus, so that, according to the Ev-
erett interpretation, the wavefunction contains 2N branches that correspond
to all possible sequences of the results of the measurements performed so far.
That is, using (2),∏
i=1,N
αθ(i)χ0 −→
∑
Psi
cmsN−mΨ(s1, s2, ...sN) (13)
where αθ(i) is the initial state of spin i and χ0 refers to the initial state of
the detecting apparatus, including the observer Bob, which is independent of
θ, given the assumptions set out earlier. Each parameter si has two values,
+ and −; Ψ(s1, s2, ...sN) represents the state of the whole system (i.e. spins,
measuring apparatus and Bob) after the results si have been recorded in
a measurements on spin i for all i from 1 to N ; m equals the number of
positive spins in this set;
∑
Psi
implies a summation over all 2N permutations
of si. Each term in the summation refers to a separate branch in the Everett
interpretation.
It follows from (13) that the number of branches in which m positive
results have been recorded is N !/m!(N−m)! and the Born weight associated
with this whole subset equals c2ms2(N−m). Under the Copenhagen interpre-
tation, the probability of observing m positive results is the product of these
two quantities: this has a maximum value when m = M = Nc2 (= 3N/4, if
θ = pi/3 as in case 3 above) and a standard deviation of |cs|N1/2 (= √3/4).
Suppose now that the Everett assumptions hold so that there has been no
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collapse. After the measurement, the wavefunction (13) will consist of a lin-
ear combination of branches, each of which contains a version of Bob who
has recorded a value for m. If N is large, the vast majority of observers will
observe approximately equal numbers of positive and negative results and a
small minority will observe results in the vicinity of the ratio predicted by
the Born rule. Repeating the experiment with a different value of θ does not
change the number of observers recording any particular result, so, if this
were all there were to it, Bob’s experience would not correlate with the ap-
paratus setting and he would be unable to deduce a reliable value of θ from
his observations. However, the Everett interpretation only works if this is not
all there is to it. Because of subjective uncertainty, an observer’s successors
in branches that have a high Born-rule weight are somehow favoured over the
others. How this can work is at the heart of the difficulties many critics have
with the Everett interpretation, but let us leave this on one side. The fact
that these successors are so preferred, means that they can with confidence
deduce the value of θ from their observations of M and N . Acquiring this
information must therefore have altered their reduced state, in contradiction
to the Everettian assumptions set out above.
Several points should be noted about the above. First, the contradiction
does not arise in the Copenhagen interpretation because, as noted earlier, this
assumes that stochasticity arises at the point where the spin emerges from the
Stern-Gerlach magnet. The information as to which branch is occupied by
the spin is additional to that contained in the wavefunction and is obtained
by Bob through the collapse process. Hence, no contradiction arises when
this is used by the experimenter to guide his expectations about subsequent
measurements.
Second, it should be emphasized that the argument applies only to infor-
mation about the apparatus setting that is obtained by Bob as a result of the
measurement process. He could of course have been told in advance how the
apparatus was set up so, in this case, χ0 would already be a function of θ.
The later argument could probably be extended to show that he should not
be able to obtain further information about θ by the measurement process,
but I believe it clarifies the discussion if we focus on the case where Bob has
no prior knowledge of θ: to demonstrate inconsistency, it is only necessary
to establish a contradiction in at least one particular case.
Third, although I have focussed on the Born rule, the above arguments
would apply equally well to any model in which the outcome frequencies were
assumed to depend systematically on the expansion coefficients. This is of
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rather marginal interest given that the Born rule is the one that is established
by experiment.
If we accept the above, it follows that the only way probability should be
able to enter the Everett interpretation is if all branches are assigned equal
weight. Might it nevertheless be possible to reconcile this conclusion with
experiment? Up to now, we have assumed one branch per outcome, without
attempting to justify this. We now turn to the question of “branch count-
ing”, which means considering the number of branches associated with any
given measurement outcome. If we accept the argument that the expansion
coefficients play no role in determining the outcome likelihood in an Ev-
erettian context, then an experimenter’s expectation of a particular outcome
should be proportional to the number of branches associated with it. Such
an assumption is similar to that made in statistical thermodynamics, where
the ergodic hypothesis states that the result of averaging over an ensemble
of systems is the same as the time average for a single system. When applied
to the symmetric case, this is an essential part of the arguments leading to
(9) and (10). However, branch counting has been strongly criticized by DSW
on a number of grounds. Wallace (2007) considers a scenario in which extra
branching is introduced into one (say the plus) channel by associating with it
a device that displays one of, say, a million random numbers. He argues that
this must be irrelevant to an experimenter who sees only the measurement
result and is indifferent to the outcome of the randomizing apparatus. This
is because “if we divide one outcome into equally-valued suboutcomes, that
division is not decision-theoretically relevant”. However, this argument does
not fully take into account the Everettian context. Referring again to the
classical game discussed earlier and illustrated in figure 1, we can consider
the additional branching on the right of both setups as due to the presence
of a randomizer with three possible outputs. In the case of the C game, these
are indeed irrelevant to the expectation of the player, because a ball emerges
from only one of the three channels and must therefore have passed through
the upper channel at the previous stage. However, in the case of the E game,
the chances of observing a black ball are enhanced (tripled) by the splitting
and this would have to be taken into account by any rational player, even if
the only result she sees is the colour of the ball. Similarly, if we introduce a
random number machine as Wallace suggests, then its state will be a linear
combination of its million possible outcomes and all these will be associated
with a positive value of spin. Given that there is only one branch associated
with the alternative outcome, we could well expect the subjective likelihood
19
of a positive result to be one million times greater than that for a negative
outcome.
A second argument deployed to criticize branch counting is based on the
fact that the interaction of a quantum system with its environment leads to
an immensely complex branching structure. Indeed it is claimed by DSW
that the number of branches is not only very large (possibly infinite), but is
also subject to very large and rapid fluctuations before, during and after the
observation of a result; which may mean that it is not meaningful to talk
about even the approximate number of branches that exist at any time. This
is adduced as a reason why a rational player should ignore the complexity
of the branching structure and instead expect to observe results consistent
with the Born rule. However, if the likelihood of observing a particular result
is proportional to the number of associated branches, the complexity intro-
duced by decoherence should actually result in the outcome of a measurement
being completely unpredictable. The situation is similar to chaos in classical
mechanics or to turbulence in hydrodynamics, whose onset certainly does not
lead to increased predictability. In the arguments above, we assumed that
each outcome was associated with a single branch, so what would be the
likely consequences of a complex branch structure in an Everettian context?
First, there may well be situations in which we could expect the number
of branches associated with different outcomes to be equal, at least when
averaged over a number of measurements, and in this case our earlier discus-
sion would not be affected. However, we might be able to devise a situation
(e.g. one in which a detector was placed in the positive output channel only)
where the numbers of branches in the two channels would be expected to
differ greatly. We should then expect to detect a larger number of (say)
positive than negative results This would be true even if the Stern-Gerlach
apparatus were oriented symmetrically—i.e. with θ = pi/2, so the symmetry
on which we based some of our earlier arguments would not hold. The com-
plexity and fluctuations of the branch structure in the Everett case would
render even the statistical results of a quantum measurement unpredictable.
Such a situation is sometimes described as being “incoherent” and it has
been argued that this would mean that the universe would be nothing like
the one we experience. However, the obvious conclusion to draw from this
is that the Everett assumptions are falsified, rather than that the Everett
model is correct and the arguments based on it that lead to this incoherence
must be wrong.
It might be thought that branch counting could restore the Born rule if the
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number of branches associated with a particular outcome were proportional
to the Born weight. However, not only is there no obvious mechanism to
achieve this, it is also inconsistent with the Everett model for the same
reasons as were set out earlier. The quantum description of the branch
structure is contained within Ψ in (13) and therefore cannot depend on the
expansion coefficients for the reasons argued above.
Conclusions
I have argued that attempts to prove the Born rule make assumptions that
are essentially self-evident in the context of the Copenhagen interpretation,
but not with the Everett model of measurement. I have further argued
that probabilities which are functions of the expansion coefficients are not
consistent with the Everett interpretation, because these quantities are not
then accessible to an observer in the reduced state associated with a branch.
An alternative scheme that could be consistent with Everett is one where
each branch has the same probability and the probability of a given outcome
depends on the number of branches associated with it. However, this also
cannot be made consistent with the Born rule and it leads to predictions of
chaotic, unpredictable behaviour, in contrast to the relatively well-ordered
behaviour, invariably demonstrated in experiments. I conclude that the Born
rule is a vitally important principle in determining quantum behaviour, but
that it depends on wavefunction collapse, or something very like it, that
does not supervene upon the time-dependent Schro¨dinger equation. It would
be possible to retain the many-worlds ontology of the Everett model while
allowing information to be transferred through the measurement, but the
state evolution would no longer be governed by the Schro¨dinger equation
alone and the economy of postulates would no longer obviously outweigh the
metaphysical extravagance associated with the Everett picture.
The debate between the different interpretations of quantum mechanics
has often been metaphysical in the sense that they often make the same
predictions and cannot therefore be be distinguished experimentally. The
present paper has argued that this is not so in the case of the Everett in-
terpretation, which predicts results different from those that follow from the
Copenhagen interpretation, which in turn are supported by experiment. If
this is accepted, the Everett model will have been falsified and the search for
a consensual resolution of the quantum measurement problem will have to
be focussed elsewhere.
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